It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payo function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may dier from the Pareto dominant one.
Introduction
The general theory of equilibrium selection that has been proposed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) invokes two completely dierent selection criteria: risk dominance and payo dominance. The rst is based on individual rationality, while the second incorporates collective rationality. The latter criterion captures the idea that if one equilibrium E 1 yields all players in the game uniformly higher payos than the equilibrium E 2 does, then rational players are more tempted to play the former. The rst criterion captures the idea that, in a situation where players do not yet know which of the two equilibria, E 1 or E 2 , will be chosen, players will lean towards that equilibrium that appears less risky in the situation at hand. For the case of 2 2 games, Harsanyi and Selten give an axiomatic characterization of their risk-dominance relation. In the special case of a symmetric 2 2 game, the risk-dominance relation can be easily characterized: E 1 risk dominates E 2 if and only if each player nds it optimal to play according to E 1 if he expects the other to play in accordance with E 1 with a probability of at least 1=2.
The criteria of payo dominance and of risk dominance may yield conicting recommendations, and in such cases Harsanyi and Selten give precedence to payo dominance. An example of such a conict is illustrated in the stag hunt game from Figure 1 which has been adapted from Aumann (1990) . (Also see Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Sect. 10.12) ). Each player has two strategies, a safe one and a risky one, and if both play their risky strategy, the unique Pareto ecient outcome results. However, playing this strategy is very risky: If one player chooses it while the other player chooses the safe strategy, then the payo to the rst is only zero. In contrast, the safe strategy guarantees a payo of 7, and it might e v en yield more. In this stag hunt game (R; R) is the payo dominant equilibrium, while (S; S) is the risk-dominant equilibrium. (Indeed each player nds it optimal to play S as long as his opponent does not choose R with a probability more than 7=8.) R S R 9,9 0,8 S 8,0 7,7 The payo dominance requirement is based on collective rationality, i.e. on the assumption that rational individuals will cooperate in pursuing their common interests if the conditions of the game permit them to do so. Harsanyi and Selten argue that risk dominance is only important in those cases where there is some uncertainty about which equilibrium \should" be selected. If one equilibrium gives all players a strictly higher payo than any other equilibrium (and if this equilibrium satises all other desirable properties that the selection theory imposes) such uncertainty will not exist { each player can be reasonably certain that all other players will opt for this equilibrium { and this makes risk-dominance comparisons irrelevant. It is this argument that leads Harsanyi and Selten to give precedence to payo dominance.
Yet, relying on collective rationality is somewhat unsatisfactory. F or one, it implies that the nal theory is not ordinal, that is, two games with the same best reply structure need not have the same solutions. For example, the game from Figure 1 is best-replyequivalent to one in which the o-diagonal payos are zero and in which the payos to (R; R) and (S; S) are (1,1) and (7,7) respectively, and, in the latter, payo dominance selects (7,7) as the outcome. Secondly, one feels that it should be possible to obtain collective rationality as an outcome of individual rationality: If one equilibrium is uniformly better than another, then the players' individual deliberations should bring them to play this equilibrium. The reason that this does not happen in a game as that from Figure 1 { at least if one views the risk-dominant equilibrium as the outcome of the individual deliberation process { is that indeed a player is not suciently certain ex ante that his \partner" will play the risky equilibrium. In fact, he cannot be sure of this exactly because of the fact that his partner cannot be sure that he will play it: one only needs a \grain of doubt" in order for it to be the unique rationalizable strategy to play safe. (See Carlsson and Van Damme (1993ab) , and, for an informal argument to that extent, Schelling (1960, Chapter 9) .)
The above raises the question of whether, in games in which players can indeed be quite certain that the opponents will play the payo dominant equilibrium, or at least in games in which this equilibrium is uniquely focal, risk-dominance considerations will induce players to play this equilibrium. This note aims to address this issue, and it provides a negative answer. We consider team games, that is, games in which all players have the same payo function. Any maximum of this function is trivially an equilibrium and one might argue that, in those cases in which the maximum is unique, this maximum provides the unique focal equilibrium of the game. In other words, under those situations the conditions are most favorable for individual rationality to be in agreement with collective rationality. W e provide examples to illustrate that, even in these cases, riskdominance considerations do not necessarily lead to the playing of the unique payo dominant equilibrium. Specically, w e show that the modied Harsanyi/Selten theory, that does not invoke p a y o comparisons, may select a Pareto dominated equilibrium in a team game. 1
Notation and Denitions
In this section we i n troduce notation, and dene team games and the risk dominance relation. Readers already familiar with these concepts can immediately turn to Section 3.
Let =< A i ; u i > i 2 I be a strategic form game. I is the player set, A i is the set of pure strategies of player i and u i : A I R is the payo function of this player (A = i 2 I A i ).
We write S i for the set of mixed strategies of player i, S = i 2 I S i for the set of mixed strategy proles and u i (s) for the expected payo to player i for when s 2 S is played. A strategy prole s is a (Nash) equilibrium o f i f n o p l a y er can improve his payo by a unilateral change in strategy, i.e. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Schanuel et al. (1992) for the technical details. In particular, the latter paper points out how e(1; s ) can be found by applying the logarithmic tracing procedure.) The endpoint e(1; s ) of this path is the linear trace T(s) o f s . This tracing map T is used to dene the risk-dominance relation.
Imagine that the players are uncertain about which o f t w o equilibria, s or s , should be considered as the solution of the game. Player i assumes that his opponents already know it and he himself attaches probability z i to the solution being s and the complementary probability 1 z i to the solution being s . O b viously, in this case he will play his best response against the correlated strategy z i s The Harsanyi/Selten solution of a game is found by applying an iterative elimination procedure. Starting from an initial candidate set (consisting of all so called primitive equilibria), candidates that are payo dominated or risk dominated are successively eliminated until exactly one candidate is left. We will consider the modication of that theory that only invokes risk dominance. In both our examples the initial candidate set will simply be the set of all pure equilibria of the game. It will be clear from the above denition that it can easily happen that there is no risk-dominance relation between pure equilibria, say s and s , and that both are \maximally stable". In this case Harsanyi and Selten propose to replace the pair by one substitute equilibrium, viz. by the equilibrium s that results when the tracing procedure is applied to the mixed strategy in which each player i chooses 1=2s i +1=2s i . (Note that this, so called centroid strategy, t ypically diers from the bicentric prior as determined by (2.4).) Hence, in case of a deadlock with two equally strong candidates s and s , these equilibria are eliminated from the initial candidate set. They are replaced by the equilibrium s and the process is restarted with this new candidate set. As in both our examples, a single equilibrium remains after at most one substitution step has been performed, there is no need to go into further details of the process.
We conclude this section by giving the denition of a team game. = < A i ; u i > i 2 I is said to be a team game if u i = u j for i; j 2 I, hence, all players always have the same payo. Writing u for this common payo function, we s a y that the team game is generic if there exists a unique a 2 A at which u attains its maximum. A ttention will be conned to symmetric games, i.e. the payo to a player depends only on which actions are chosen and not on the identities of the players choosing them. Because of this symmetry w e can conne ourselves to analyzing the situation from the standpoint of player 1. In the next two sections we i n v estigate risk dominance in generic symmetric team games and compute the associated (modied) solutions.
A T w o-Person Example
The discussion in this section is based on the 2-person game from The game has three (pure) equilibria with payos 3, 3-and 2 + . W e rst investigate the risk dominance relationship between T and B. Note that when a player is uncertain whether the opponent will play T or B, but is certain that this player will not choose M, then this player will never be tempted to choose M since M is never a best response against a mixture zT+( 1 z ) B . This shows that M is irrelevant for the risk-dominance relationship between T and B and that this relationship can be determined simply in the 2 2 reduced game spanned by T and B. N o w, as is shown by the RHS of Figure 2 Figure 2 makes clear, the unique best response against this prior is B, so that the tracing path starts at B and remains there. The substitution set eliminates the pair fT;Mgand replaces it with the equilibrium B.
Hence, if we modify the theory of Harsanyi and Selten, by not imposing the payo dominance requirement, then the equilibrium B is selected in the game of Figure 2 .
Individual rationality, as incorporated into risk dominance, does not lead to collectively ecient outcomes, not even in generic symmetric team games. At the intuitive level, one may explain the phenomenon as follows. Risk considerations favor the selection of equilibria that give "reasonably good" payos against a set of diuse priors: A player does not know what the others will do and he investigates what action gives good outcomes no matter what the others do. These considerations favor actions that have large stability sets, i.e. that are best responses against many mixed strategies of the opponents. In Figure 2 , B is such a good and safe strategy. In fact, we could make the stability set of B to cover almost the entire strategy simplex without losing the fact that T is the unique payo dominant equilibrium: just replace 2 by 3-2 everywhere in the payo matrix. By increasing the payo associated to B, one makes B more attractive, hence, at the same time T is made less attractive. What this makes clear is that there is nothing special about team games. Either one assumes that the logic of common payos and collective rationality is so strong that players do not have a n y doubt to start with about what to play, or one allows for prior doubt and then one does not see how the common payo assumption helps to reduce it.
The doubt concerning what equilibrium to play m a y , for example, arise out of slight payo uncertainty as in Carlsson and Van Damme (1993a,b) . One may imagine that it is common knowledge among the players that they are playing a team game, but each player may h a v e a tiny bit of private information about what the actual payos are. If the uncertainty is small, then, if the actual game is generic, the strategy combination that attains the maximum will be mutually known to a high degree. However, around a nongeneric game the latter will not hold. As Carlsson and Van Damme show, such nongeneric games exert an inuence on \far removed" generic games: since players choose safe strategies in non-generic games, they are forced to choose safe strategies also in generic games, in order to avoid coordination failures.
To illustrate this argument, consider the modication from Figure 2 as in Figure 3 . This is a nongeneric game. As Schelling (1960, Appendix C) already argued, the unique focal equilibrium in this game is B: If players cannot communicate, then, if they aim to coordinate on T or M, they will actually succeed only with 50% probability and, hence, it is better to play B (5=2 > 1=2 3 + 1 = 2 0). Now, consider a game that is close to the one from Figure 3 , but that is generic and that has a unique maximum associated with T. Should a player play T? W ell, if he is not exactly sure that he observed the correct payos the answer is: maybe not. In that case, the actual payos may be such that the maximum is at M, or that his opponent thinks that the maximum is there. In such a case, it might still be better to choose B and thereby a v oid the coordination problem.
T M B T 3 0 2 M 0 3 2 B 2 2 5/2 Figure 3 : A Coordination Game To conclude this section, we give one individualistic rationality argument that, for 2-person team games, distinguishes the payo maximal equilibrium from any other pure equilibrium. Is it true that in such games, the payo maximal equilibrium pairwise risk dominates any other pure equilibrium. Specically, i f s is the Pareto dominant equilibrium and s is any other pure equilibrium, then in the 2 2 game in which the players only have fs ; s g available, s risk dominates s . Hence, the Pareto dominant equilibrium may be said to be the pairwise risk-dominant one. A proof is simple and uses the alternative c haracterization of risk dominance for 2 2 games given in the previous section: Since the sum of the o-diagonal payos is smaller than the sum of the diagonal (equilibrium) p a y os, the sum of the players' critical probabilities for switching away from the payo maximal equilibrium is less than one. An illustration is provided by the reduced games associated with the equilibrium T from Figure 2 , which are displayed in It should be noted that, in general, the concept of pairwise risk dominance captures the overall risk situation rather badly, see Carlsson and Van Damme (1993b) . This is also evident from the LHS of Figure 4 : when a player believes that his opponent may play T or M, then he has an incentive to play B, h o w ever, B is not present i n the reduced game. In this respect it is also interesting to refer to the relationship between risk dominance and the stochastic stability of equilibria in an evolutionary context ), Young (1993 ). In symmetric 2 2 games only the risk-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable, but Peyton Young already provided an example of a 3 3 game in which the stochastically stable equilibrium diers from the pairwise risk-dominant one. Recently, have shown that for 2 player symmetric games that satisfy the Total Bandwagon Property (TBP) and the Monotone Share Property (MSP) only the pairwise risk-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable. (TBP says that any best response against a mixture is an element of the mixture; MSP says that if a pure strategy is eliminated, the shares of all other pure strategies increase in the completely mixed equilibrium; the game from Figure 2 violates the Total Bandwagon Property.)
A Three-Person Example
The above t w o-person example is somewhat unsatisfactory since the solution process involves using the tie-breaking procedure and the latter might be considered ad hoc. The aim of this section is to provide a three-person team game that has a non-payo maximal equilibrium that strictly risk dominates any other pure equilibrium. In fact, the example has the additional (desirable) feature that the details of the tracing procedure do not matter: since the game is symmetric, the risk-dominant solution is determined directly from the bicentric prior (2.4). Finally, the example shows that for 3-player games the Pareto dominant equilibrium need not be even pairwise risk dominant. The example in question is the game given in Figure 5. (Here x is a real number in the interval [0; 1], player 1 chooses a row, 2 a column and 3 a matrix. Obviously, the payo dominant equilibrium is L if x > 1 = 3, while it is R if x < 1 = 3).
It is easily seen that (x) has two strict Nash equilibria, viz. (L; L; L) and (R; R; R).
To determine the risk-dominance relationship between these two equilibria, we compute the bicentric prior as in (2.4). If the players 2 and 3 play ( L; L) with probability z and (R; R) with probability 1 z , then player 1 strictly prefers to play L if and only if zx>(1 z)(1 x);
or, equivalently, z > 1 x:
Applying the principle of insucient reason, the players 2 and 3 attach a probability x to the inequality (4.1) being satised. Hence, the prior beliefs of the players 2 and 3 are described by player 1's mixed strategy
Since the game (x) is symmetric with respect to the players, the mixed strategy (4.2)
actually is the prior of each player i 2 f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g . T o determine the risk-dominance relationship between (L; L; L) and (R; R; R), we h a v e to determine the best response of player i when his opponents j and k independently randomize according to (4.2). We conclude this section by noting that also the equilibrium selection theory that has recently been proposed in Harsanyi (1995) and that involves a multilateral risk comparison of equilibria that is not based on the tracing procedure, does not always select the payo dominant equilibrium in team games. Harsanyi proposes to select that equilibrium that has the largest stability region. As was already indicated in Section 3, the payo dominant equilibrium may h a v e a rather small stability region. Also for the example discussed in this section, the reader may v erify that the equilibrium with the largest stability region, need not be payo dominant. (Harsanyi denes the stability region of a strategy as the set of correlated strategies of the opponents against which the strategy is a best response, hence, the stability region of L is the set in the threedimensional unit simplex where p(R; R) x. He does not just take the Lebesgue measure of this set but rst applies a transformation of the simplex.)
Conclusion
From one point of view one might argue that a generic team game is simple to play: Firstly, the payos of the players coincide so that there is no conict of interest; sec-ondly, the payo function admits a unique maximum so that there is no risk of confusion. Hence, one might s a y that the unique payo dominant equilibrium is the unique focal point: Players might view the game just as a one-person decision problem and solve i t accordingly. These arguments are even more compelling for symmetric games. Upon closer inspection it turns out, however, that the above argument is not entirely convincing: The Pareto dominant focal point is not robust and this is reected in the fact that risk-dominance considerations need not select it. Hence, even in symmetric team games, collective rationality need not be implied by individual rationality. With Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 359) we m a y conclude that \if one feels that payo dominance is an essential aspect of game theoretic rationality, then one must explicitly incorporate it into one's concept of rationality."
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which team games are dierent from games in which the players' payo functions do not coincide. Aumann (1990) argued that, in the stag hunt game of Figure 1 , even communication cannot help to bring about the equilibrium (R; R) in case players are convinced a priori that (S; S) is the solution of the game without communication. When communication is possible each player will always (i.e. no matter how h e i n tends to play) suggest the other to play R since he can only benet by having the other do so. Consequently, no new information is revealed by communication, hence, communication cannot inuence the outcome. One may argue that things are somewhat dierent if it is common knowledge that the game is a team game: In this case a player has no incentive whatever to suggest an outcome dierent from the payo maximal one. It remains to be investigated whether risk dominance selects the payo dominant equilibrium if one, or more, rounds of preplay communication are added to the game. At a somewhat more abstract level one may raise the question of why payo dominance and risk dominance may be in conict even in team games. I conjecture that this is because of the ordinality property of the risk-dominance concept. Hence, the conjecture is that there exist two team games with the same best reply correspondence that have dierent p a y o-dominant equilibria. Thus far, I have not been able to formally prove this conjecture.
